The Inappropriate Imposition of Court-Ordered Mediation in Will Contests by Haneman, Victoria J.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2011
The Inappropriate Imposition of Court-Ordered
Mediation in Will Contests
Victoria J. Haneman
University of LA Verne
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Victoria J. Haneman, The Inappropriate Imposition of Court-Ordered Mediation in Will Contests , 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 513 (2011)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/4
  
 
513 
THE INAPPROPRIATE IMPOSITION OF COURT-
ORDERED MEDIATION IN WILL CONTESTS 
VICTORIA J. HANEMAN* 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 513 
 II. AN OVERVIEW OF MEDIATION............................................. 516 
 III. COURT-ORDERED MEDIATION AND PROBATE DISPUTES ..... 521 
 IV. THE INAPPROPRIATE IMPOSITION OF COURT-ORDERED  
  MEDIATION IN WILL CONTESTS........................................... 526 
 V. TOWARDS SOLUTIONS:  THE APPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF  
  MEDIATION TO WILL CONTESTS .......................................... 531 
 VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 534 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The concept of inheritance is embraced by the public even though it seems to run 
contrary to the American ideology of equality of opportunity.1  Accumulating assets 
and developing some form of family legacy to pass to our heirs is a process rooted in 
optimism and hope, and those who cannot realistically anticipate inheriting or 
bequeathing anything of value nonetheless set great store by their right to do so.2  A 
society that has granted the power to designate one’s successors in ownership must 
                                                          
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of La Verne; B.A., Arizona State University, 
1996; J.D., California Western School of Law, 1999; LL.M. New York University, 2000, 
Taxation.  My heartfelt gratitude to Elaine Guthormsen for assistance with research and 
taming my unruly footnotes.   
 
1
 “Through inheritance, wealthy families produce durable legacies of astonishing 
privilege.  Although the vast majority of Americans will neither give nor receive an estate of 
any financial substance, most Americans accept the institution, despite its apparent conflict 
with their interests.”  J.D. Trout & Shahid A. Buttar, Resurrecting “Death Taxes”: 
Inheritance, Redistribution, and the Science of Happiness, 16 J.L. & POL. 765, 765 (2000). 
 
2
 For example,   
The most puzzling political obstacle to estate tax revision, however, is that the 
American people do not seem to like heavy taxes on bequests . . . . [A] recent 
California initiative to repeal the state’s inheritance tax garnered a sixty-four percent 
positive vote.  This was a greater majority than those in favor of a nuclear freeze or 
against gun registration, issues on a subsequent initiative ballot.  The only convincing 
explanation that has occurred to me for this phenomenon lies in the optimism of the 
American people.  In California, at least, sixty-four percent of the people must believe 
that they will be in the wealthiest five to ten percent when they die.   
Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 285 (1983).   
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necessarily reallocate these property rights.3  To this end, the freedom of the 
individual to designate his heirs is a foundational norm that permeates doctrine in the 
law of wills, and as a result, the idea of testator intent has reached near-mythical 
stature.4  Our courts facilitate testamentary intent unless doing so contravenes 
established law or public policy.5 
A will is a direct expression of testamentary intent that is said to be the source of 
litigation more than any other legal document.6  Complex emotional and personal 
issues can easily transform inheritance into a destructive process.7  A probate court 
considers a broad range of contested matters, such as objections to financial 
accounting, petitions for the removal and surcharge of fiduciaries, and charges of 
breach of fiduciary duty.8  Will contest cases generally arise from a claim that the 
testator9 lacked capacity or the will is invalid.10  While most jurisdictions treat a will 
                                                          
 
3
 Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 
YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1941) (“One fundamental proposition is that, under a legal system recognizing 
the individualistic institution of private property and granting to the owner the power to 
determine his successors in ownership, the general philosophy of the courts should favor 
giving effect to an intentional exercise of that power.”).   
 
4
 Victoria J. Haneman, Changing the Estate Planning Malpractice Landscape: Applying 
the Constructive Trust to Cure Testamentary Mistake, 80 UMKC L. REV. 91, 91 (2011).   
 
5
 There is no universally accepted definition of “testamentary intent.”  See Scott T. 
Jarboe, Note, Interpreting a Testator’s Intent From the Language of Her Will: A Descriptive 
Linguistics Approach, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1365, 1365 (2002) (quoting Andrea W. Cornelison, 
Dead Man Talking: Are Courts Ready to Listen? The Erosion of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 811, 811 (2001)) (“‘The ordinary standard [for determining 
testamentary intent] . . . is simply the meaning of the people who did not write the document.  
The fallacy consists in assuming that there is or ever can be some one real and absolute 
meaning.  In truth, there can only be some person’s meaning; and that person, whose meaning 
the law is seeking, is the writer of the document . . . .’”).           
 
6
 “[E]mpirical study suggests that ‘[w]ill contests rarely occur, perhaps on the order of 
one in one hundred or so cases.’”  John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2042 
n.5 (1994) (reviewing DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993)) (citing Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests: An 
Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 607, 614 (1987)).  “Because, however, there 
are millions of probates per year, one-in-a-hundred litigation patterns are very serious.”  Id.   
 
7
 Perhaps this is because “[b]equeathing something to others is an expression of caring 
about them, and it intensifies those bonds.  It also marks, and perhaps sometimes creates, an 
extended identity.”  ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 30 (1989). 
 
8
 Michael G. Cumming, Michigan Estate and Trust Litigation in the 21st Century, 77 
MICH. B.J. 1300, 1300 (1998). 
 
9
 A will is a direct expression of the decedent’s intent, and the decedent who has taken 
the steps to execute a will is said to be testate.  There are many reasons why a decedent fails to 
execute a will and dies intestate: poor access to resources, insufficient resources to bear the 
expense, an unwillingness to contemplate death, or no interest in inheritance.  The intestacy 
rules ensure that the failure to execute a will does not exclude this decedent from the 
inheritance process.  Lawrence L. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. 
L. REV. 21, 29-32 (1994).  See generally Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The 
Dynamics of Wills and Demographic Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 36 (2009).    
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contest as if it is merely an in rem probate proceeding, it may be distinguished as a 
hybrid action that is both civil and probate in character.11  The only relief possible in 
a will contest claim is a court order to deny or allow probate of some or all of the 
will in question.12   
Following the successful implementation of court-ordered mediation programs in 
divorce and family law cases, similar programs are being adopted to mandate the use 
of mediation13 in will contest cases.  Although the appeal of such programs may be 
cynically attributed to the judicial system’s persistent concern with docket control, it 
has also been suggested that the use of mediation to resolve will contest cases will 
eliminate costly, winner-take-all litigation.14  Resolving disputes while preserving 
relationships is a legitimate objective in light of the fact that the controversies arising 
from wills and trusts often involve individuals who have some form of familial or 
continuing relationship.15  
The process of mediation shapes settlement without rigid deference to legal rules, 
and the intent of the testator may necessarily be marginalized as an impediment to 
reaching an agreement.16  The testator is not represented at the negotiating table, and 
to the extent that one of the parties feels that he is carrying out the wishes of the 
deceased, he may become unyielding in his position and unlikely to consider a 
                                                          
 
10
 Challenges to capacity may allege that the testator lacked testamentary capacity, 
suffered from insane delusions, or executed the will (or provisions of the will) as a result of 
undue influence, fraud, or duress.  See, e.g., Warren F. Gorman, Testamentary Capacity in 
Alzheimer’s Disease, 4 ELDER L.J. 225, 231-32 (1996); Joseph A. Rosenberg, Regrettably 
Unfair: Brooke Astor and the Other Elderly in New York, 30 PACE L. REV. 1004, 1051 (2010); 
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Can Religious Influence Ever Be “Undue” Influence?, 73 BROOK. L. 
REV. 579, 613-14 n.196 (2008).  Challenges to will validity are usually grounded on a claim 
that the will was not validly executed, the will was validly revoked, the will was altered, or the 
will is a forgery.  EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS §§ 5:1, 5:3 (2d ed. 
1999).  Disputes may also arise because the parties claim that a provision in the will is 
ambiguous.  Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve Probate 
Disputes Over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 415 (1997).   
 
11
 EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 1:2 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that 
will contests are analytically no different from filing an objection to an executor’s accounting 
or the payment of a claim). 
 
12
 Id. 
 
13
 Mediation is a non-binding negotiation process.  See Stanard T. Klinefelter & Sandra P. 
Gohn, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Its Value to Estate Planners, 22 EST. PLAN. 147, 148 
(1995). 
 
14
 See Andrew Stimmel, Note, Mediating Will Disputes: A Proposal to Add a 
Discretionary Mediation Clause to the Uniform Probate Code, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
197, 197 (2002).   
 
15
 As compared to litigation involving entities or unrelated individuals, “[s]tudies have 
shown that it is generally the adult children bringing the will contests, with 71.3% brought by 
the children or stepchildren and 13.2% by the spouses.”  Melissa Street, Note, A Holistic 
Approach to Estate Planning: Paramount in Protecting Your Family, Your Wealth, and Your 
Legacy, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 142-43 (2007). 
 
16
 Ray D. Madoff, Lurking in the Shadow: The Unseen Hand of Doctrine in Dispute 
Resolution, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 161, 177-78 (2002). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
516 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:513 
 
negotiated outcome.17  Perhaps it is best said that the substantive law of wills focuses 
on the property rights of the deceased, while mediation resolves the disputes of the 
living.   
Mediation settlements that are shaped or driven by non-legal considerations are 
not problematic, unless and until the process of mediation is designed and imposed 
upon the parties through state action (namely, the judicial system).  Because the 
approach taken in mediation ineradicably strains against the legal rules applied by 
the courts adjudicating those same cases, a legitimate question arises as to whether 
or not instituting court-ordered mediation programs that mandate mediation in will 
contest cases is appropriate.18  The contention of this Article is not that mediation is 
inappropriately used by the parties to a will contest case, but instead that court-
ordered mediation is inappropriate.  This Article begins in Section II with a brief 
overview of the mediation process.  Section III considers court-ordered mediation 
and probate disputes.  The inappropriate imposition of court-ordered mediation in 
will contest cases is discussed in Section IV.  Finally, an easily implemented 
solution that marries process with policy is proposed in Section V.    
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF MEDIATION19 
Mediation is an informal dispute resolution process20 that utilizes a trained third 
party facilitator to oversee “communication and negotiation between parties to assist 
them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.”21  Perhaps one of 
the most attractive features of mediation is that it is a process that is not fully formed 
and may therefore be shaped in a number of different ways.22  Mediators utilize a 
myriad of different techniques,23 and becoming too entrenched in one style or 
                                                          
 
17
 “As one mediator, describing the difficulties of mediating will disputes explained, 
‘[T]here is a shadow at the table who can’t speak and can’t inform the discussion.’”  Id. at 
178.   
 
18
 A legitimate action by a governmental branch is one that, even if the individual 
disagrees, comports with an overarching sense of what is fair, just, and reasonable.  See, e.g., 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137 (1993) (noting that “our exercise of political power 
is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of 
which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”).   
 
19
 “Mediation . . . predates the creation and enforcement of formal law.”  Richard M. 
Calkins, Mediation: The Gentler Way, 41 S.D. L. REV. 277, 277 (1996).   
 
20
 Mediation is “informal” in the sense that a binding result is not imposed upon the 
parties, as with arbitration or litigation.  James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in 
the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171, 173, 
178 n.28 (2001).         
 
21
 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(1) (2001).   
 
22
 Michael Pryles, Assessing Dispute Resolution Procedures, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 267, 
278 (1996).   
 
23
 Kenneth M. Roberts, Mediating the Evaluative-Facilitative Debate: Why Both Parties 
Are Wrong and a Proposal for Settlement, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 187, 191 (2007) (critiquing the 
evaluative versus facilitative approaches to mediation, and arguing that a mediator who adopts 
one stylistic approach to the exclusion of the other is not effective).  See also Richard Birke, 
Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 309, 309-10 (2000) 
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approach limits the mediator’s ability to respond to important factors that will impact 
a successful outcome—such as the nature of the dispute and the relationship between 
the parties.24  As a result of this flexibility and adaptability, there are numerous 
activities bearing no relation to one another that nonetheless may all be fairly 
characterized as mediation.25 
Several factors distinguish mediation from other dispute resolution processes.  
An element of voluntariness characterizes mediation, and even when court-ordered, 
the parties must choose to cooperate with one another to reach resolution.26  
Mediation is a non-binding process in which the parties retain complete control over 
decision-making, and no final judgment or result is imposed upon the parties at the 
conclusion of the process.27  The emphasis is upon generating a solution that is 
acceptable to both parties.28  The process of mediation is facilitated by a neutral third 
                                                          
(arguing that there is no such thing as either a purely evaluative or facilitative mediation of a 
legal dispute). 
 
24
 Mediators take many different approaches to direct all energies towards settlement.  In 
assisting the parties, mediators will direct focus to what each party is willing to do, as opposed 
to what each party expects from the other. He or she will also assist in generating options.  
Creative options will be considered without being immediately discarded, and sometimes the 
most outlandish ideas will be recast into workable solutions that satisfy the needs of all parties 
involved.  See generally DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE 
STRATEGIES FOR NEUTRALS AND ADVOCATES (2009); Pryles, supra note 22, at 277-78.   
 
25
 See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and 
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 8 (1996) (“[A] bewildering 
variety of activities fall within the broad, generally-accepted definition of mediation . . . . 
Some of these processes have little in common with one another.”).           
 
26
 Dr. Iur. Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party Empowerment—Against a Good Faith 
Requirement in Mandatory Mediation, 23 REV. LITIG. 1, 12 n.52 (2004).  See also Andreas 
Nelle, Making Mediation Mandatory: A Proposed Framework, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
287, 287 (1992) (“[M]ediation is doubly voluntary: it is entered into voluntarily and it 
produces a result which is solely based on the parties’ agreement.”).      
 
27
 J. Brad Reich, Attorney v. Client: Creating a Mechanism to Address Competing Process 
Interests in Lawyer-Driven Mediation, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 183, 199 n.76 (2002).  Though 
agreements can be drafted and signed, so as to be enforceable, no one imposes any 
arrangement upon either of the parties.  See Bethany Verhoef Brands et al., The Iowa 
Mediation Service: An Empirical Study of Iowa Attorneys’ Views on Mandatory Farm 
Mediation, 79 IOWA L. REV. 653, 683-84 (1994).     
 
28
 Maureen A. Weston, Confidentiality’s Constitutionality: The Incursion of Judicial 
Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
29, 42-43 (2003).    
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party.29  The role of the mediator is to assist participants towards settlement without 
manipulation or coercion.30       
Outside of these defining characteristics, mediation need not follow an 
established structure.31  Before the mediation process begins, most mediators engage 
in some type of preliminary meeting with each party, to make introductions and 
discuss any information that should be known in advance of the process.32  It is 
common for a joint session to be conducted at the outset of mediation to allow each 
party (or counsel for each party) to briefly summarize his claim.33  After the joint 
session, the work of the mediator begins in earnest, as he meets with the parties to 
frame the issues and explore possible solutions.  Some mediators will keep the 
parties separated until a resolution is reached, while others avoid the use of private 
caucuses.34  Mediation usually concludes when either the terms of a settlement are 
                                                          
 
29
 This person is neutral in that he should have no stake in the outcome of the dispute and 
no bias in favor of one party over another.  The belief is that a mediator’s neutrality provides 
him with an unobscured view of the merits of the case to assist with creative resolution.  
James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 919, 921 (1997).  See also Alison E. Gerencser, Alternative Dispute Resolution Has 
Morphed into Mediation: Standards of Conduct Must Be Changed, 50 FLA. L. REV. 843, 847-
48 (1998).  
 
30
 Amanda L. Marutzky, Making a Deal with the Devil: A Mediation Approach to 
Mitigating the Negative Effects of Church Conflict, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 303, 315 
(2010).  Even if the parties would be unable to settle without the assistance of a mediator, they 
would understandably be unhappy with any settlement that they were coerced into accepting.    
 
31
 There has been much debate as to the number of stages in the mediation process; 
anywhere from two to nine stages have been advocated, including introduction, joint session, 
private caucuses, and agreement.  See John T. Blankenship, The Vitality of the Opening 
Statement in Mediation: A Jumping-Off Point to Consider the Process of Mediation, 9 
APPALACHIAN J.L. 165, 180 & n.103 (2010).   
 
32
 A preliminary meeting may be in-person or by conference call.  Paul R. Gupta & Sunni 
Yuen, JAMS Materials, in RESOLVING TECHNOLOGY AND MEDIA DISPUTES BEFORE TRIAL 92 
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Ser. No. 914, 
2007).  The mediator may also use the preliminary meeting to establish important ground 
rules; for example, the mediator may explain that no personal attacks will be allowed, or that 
everyone will have unlimited time to be heard and the party speaking should not be 
interrupted.  Gabriel P. Soto, Environmental Regulatory Mediation, 8 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 
253, 258-59 (2007).   
 
33
 Anthony C. Piazza, How Mediators Operate: A Mediator’s View, in HOW ADR WORKS 
127, 131-32 (Norman Brand ed., 2002).  The mediator is listening to identify underlying 
interests and obstacles to settlement.  This is also a valuable opportunity for counsel, as this 
may be the first time that one party will have to listen to the opponent’s summary of the 
strengths of his case, affording an assessment of both opposing counsel and client.  Richard 
M. Calkins, Caucus Mediation—Putting Conciliation Back Into the Process: The 
Peacemaking Approach to Resolution, Peace, and Healing, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 287-88 
(2006); Joshua J. Engelbart, Federal Mediation Privilege: Should Mediation Communications 
Be Protected From Subsequent Civil & Criminal Proceedings?, 1999 J. DISP. RESOL. 73, 76 
(1999).   
 
34
 Private caucuses provide an excellent opportunity for the mediator to speak directly to 
the parties without communications being filtered through counsel.  The parties can openly 
discuss issues and express emotions that they may not wish to reveal to the opposing party.  
Ronald Chester, Less Law, But More Justice?: Jury Trials and Mediation, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 
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confirmed and reduced to writing,35 or the mediator determines that a resolution will 
not be reached.36 
Settlement is unlikely to occur unless the parties understand and accept two 
important concepts.  First, each party must come to the mediation table with some 
willingness (however tenuous) to compromise.  A major—perhaps 
insurmountable—barrier exists when a party is stubbornly entrenched in his own 
position.37  Further, all participants must appreciate and respect the confidentiality of 
the proceeding.38  Mediation does not function properly without assurances of 
confidentiality because “if the process is to work, [parties must] fully disclose to the 
mediator their needs and tactics--not only those that have been publicly revealed, but 
also their private views and internal arrangements.”39   
                                                          
173, 194-95 (1999); Rita Lowery Gitchell & Andrew Plattner, Mediation: A Viable 
Alternative to Litigation for Medical Malpractice Cases, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 421, 
458 n.254 (1999).  “Those who avoid the private caucus do so for several reasons: they 
believe that it gets in the way of the parties’ developing an understanding of each other; 
wastes time; and impairs party autonomy by giving the mediator too much power . . . .”  
Leonard L. Riskin, Teaching and Learning from the Mediations in Barry Werth’s Damages, 
2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 134 (2004).     
 
35
 Written agreements are preferred over oral, as memories can be unreliable.  Alejandro 
V. Cortes, The H-2A Farmworker: The Latest Incarnation of the Judicially Handicapped and 
Why the Use of Mediation to Resolve Employment Disputes Will Improve Their Rights, 21 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 409, 435 n.159 (2006) (noting that some courts have refused to 
enforce oral settlement agreements—which are more likely to be misunderstood or disagreed 
on by the parties).  See also David C. Albalah & Jesse D. Steele, For Business Dispute 
Solutions, Process Matters, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 385, 387 n.6 (2010) (“[T]he 
settlement agreement must be drafted and signed, before ‘settlor’s remorse’ can creep in.  The 
risk of losing a settlement explodes exponentially if the parties leave the mediation room 
without a signed document in hand.”).  The mediator’s role is to ensure there is a meeting of 
the minds on the agreement, that all terms are clear and understood, and that the parties are 
prepared to commit to the agreement on the table.  Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of 
Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 716 (1997).  
The mediator should also ensure that the agreement will be enforceable later should some 
future conflict arise.  If a mediator has knowledge that one or both of the parties have a past 
history of breaching settlement agreements, it is generally advisable to refer the parties to a 
different resolution process.  Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed 
Mediators and Florida’s Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 702, 717 
(1994) (“A mediator must not knowingly assist in forming an agreement that would be denied 
judicial enforcement because of fraud, duress, overreaching, the absence of bargaining ability, 
or unconscionability.”). 
 
36
 Jack G. Marcil & Nicholas D. Thornton, Avoiding Pitfalls: Common Reasons for 
Mediation Failure and Solutions for Success, 84 N.D. L. REV. 861, 861-62 (2008).   
 
37
 Moberly, supra note 35, at 717 (“[I]f the mediator believes that either party has become 
unwilling or unable to meaningfully participate, mediation should be suspended or 
terminated.”).   
 
38
 Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflict 
for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentiality and the Duty 
to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715, 722–23 (1997).  
        39
 Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil:  The Intolerable Conflict 
for Attorney-Mediators . . . 1997 BYU LR 715, 723 (quoting: In re Joint E. & S. Dists. 
Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735, 739 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990)). 
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The many advantages of mediation have been a catalyst for its growing 
popularity.40  Mediation is cost-effective as compared to other alternative dispute 
resolution processes or litigation.41  The borders of settlement are flexible, and thus 
the parties are able to explore untried, unusual or maverick agreements.42  Although 
the parties are bound by a written agreement when mediation concludes in 
settlement, both parties have agreed to the terms of the negotiated outcome and there 
rarely seems to be a breach of the agreement.43  Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of 
mediation is that it provides a means to resolve disputes without destroying long-
                                                          
There are several theories of law that, in combination with state statutes and court rules, serve 
to protect disclosures made during mediation.  See James M. Assey, Jr., Comment, Mum’s the 
Word on Mediation: Confidentiality and Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 991, 949-99 (1996).  Those participating in mediation (including the mediator) cannot 
be forced to testify regarding statements made or documents prepared for mediation.  Id.  A 
number of cases that address the issue of confidentiality in mediation wholeheartedly support 
this conclusion.  See NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(concluding that the public interest in assuring the effectiveness of the mediation process 
outweighed other conflicting public interests); Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, 
Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979) (comparing the absence of confidentiality in mediation 
to a high-stakes poker game, with participants cleverly and deceptively playing a game to 
deceive, as opposed to striving for a just solution); Ryan v. Garcia, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158, 162-
63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that the settlement agreement was inadmissible in court, even 
to prove the fact that there was a settlement).                           
 
40
 Mediation is the most popular “form of alternat[ive] dispute resolution among the 1,000 
largest . . .  corporations.”  HENRY S. KRAMER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE 
WORKPLACE § 4.02[1] (Supp. 2003).     
 
41
 Americans are “disenchanted with the legal system because it is virtually unavailable to 
persons of average means, yet it is the only forum for resolving disputes with certainty.”  
Frank Evans & Teresa Stanton Collett, Symposium, The Lawyer’s Duties and Responsibilities 
in Dispute Resolution, Foreword, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 375, 375 (1997).  See also Hoken S. 
Seki, Perspective: Effective Dispute Resolution in United States-Japan Commercial 
Transactions, 6 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 979, 1003 (1984) (noting the irony that “[m]any 
times, the total costs of litigation in the United States far surpass the amount of money or 
economic value which is in dispute between the parties.”).  The process of pretrial discovery 
in the U.S., often referred to as a “fishing expedition” by other nations, is expensive, 
burdensome and time-consuming for parties.  Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. 
REV. 559, 569 (1992); Yoshio Ohara, Symposium, Judicial Assistance to be Afforded by 
Japan for Proceedings in the United States, 23 INT’L LAW. 10, 21 (1989).  Instead of entering 
mediation after all discovery is completed, attorneys are realizing that they can utilize this 
process when they have enough information to understand the dispute.  Colloquy, Clients 
Driving Increased Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, ILL. LEGAL TIMES 16 (1994). 
 
42
 See Colloquy, supra note 41.     
 
43
 With mediated settlements, the parties reach consensus after their own active 
participation, which may be the primary reason that these agreements are rarely breached.  See 
Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation—Tension 
Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public 
Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 511 (2004) (“The dearth of contested 
cases supported the notion that parties enthusiastically comply with mediated settlement 
agreements.  Empirical studies further reinforced the belief that mediation participants came 
away from mediations happy, compliant, and satisfied.”).           
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term relationships.44  There is less cause for hostility if a dispute is resolved without 
the formal declaration of a “winner”45 and both parties feel as if their primary 
interests and needs have been satisfied.46   
III.  COURT-ORDERED MEDIATION AND PROBATE DISPUTES 
Mediation is a process of facilitated negotiation in which participation by the 
parties is either voluntary or mandatory.  With the former, the parties to the dispute 
have agreed to use mediation and generally hire their own mediator.  With 
mandatory or court-ordered mediation, a court order requires the parties to use 
mediation.  In both instances, the process is non-binding and no settlement is forced 
upon the parties.  This section explores mandatory or court-ordered mediation 
programs in the United States and considers the use of court-ordered mediation to 
resolve will contest cases.    
An increasing number of states are developing court-ordered mediation 
programs.47  Although such programs vary widely, generally cases are referred on 
either a categorical or discretionary basis.  That is to say, either a statute provides 
that certain categories of civil cases will proceed through mediation or judges are 
given the discretion to refer appropriate cases to mediation.48  The courts will order 
the appropriate cases to mediation, issue procedural rules to regulate the program, 
and certify the mediators.49  Court-ordered mediation does not raise any obvious 
constitutional concerns, as the parties are not expected or required to settle.50 
These programs are intended to serve the public interest—a case that is settled 
through mediation is one less case on the burgeoning court dockets, resolved with 
less time and expense to both the parties and the judicial system.51  However, 
                                                          
 
44
 Moberly, supra note 35, at 709.   
 
45
 “A dispute is a problem to be solved together, not a combat to be won.”  Holly A. 
Streeter-Schaefer, Note, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 367, 
368 (2001).       
 
46
 See Colloquy, supra note 41.    
 
47
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-6-20(b) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7702 (2011) 
(Delaware mandates mediation before litigation if the claim is for more than $100,000); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4108 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1 (1999); Streeter-Schaefer, 
supra note 45, at 375 (citing Lester H. Berkson, Supreme Court Mandated Mediation-A Giant 
Step Forward, NEV. LAW., Oct. 1998, at 22) (discussing Nevada’s implementation of a court-
mandated mediation program); John R. Van Winkle, Mediation: An Analysis of Indiana’s 
Court-Annexed Mediation Rule, 25 IND. L. REV. 957, 964, 966 (1992) (Indiana’s court rules 
allow mediation to be ordered without the consent of the parties.  The parties must participate 
in good faith.).        
 
48
 Frank E. Sander et al., Judicial (Mis)Use of ADR? A Debate, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 885, 
885-86 (1996).   
 
49
 Stevens H. Clarke & Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Public Sponsorship of Private Settling: 
Court-Ordered Civil Case Mediation, 19 JUST. SYS. J. 311, 335 (1997).   
 
50
 Kendall D. Isaac, Pre-Litigation Compulsory Mediation: A Concept Worth Negotiating, 
32 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 165, 170 (2011). 
 
51
 For example, 
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concerns have been raised about court-ordered mediation.  Mediation interposes 
another layer of expense for those parties who want to proceed to litigation but are 
forced, by court order, to suffer through the process.52  Further, an important 
characteristic of mediation is that the parties control the decision-making process, 
and some commentators insist that coercing the parties to submit to mediation 
contradicts the consensual and cooperative nature of the process.53  Critics assert that 
“coercion into the mediation process translates into coercion in the mediation 
process, creating undue settlement pressures that produce unfair outcomes.”54  
Voluntariness is eroded when a court strips from the parties the choice to participate, 
                                                          
[T]he North Carolina and Maine studies indicate that mediated settlements usually do 
not replace trials, which are costly to both litigants and the court system.  The North 
Carolina study indicates that the program did not reduce litigants’ costs, nor did 
mediated settlement increase plaintiffs’ satisfaction compared to conventional 
settlement.  Most cases settled in mediation would have settled anyway.  One judge 
said upon hearing our results, “What difference does it make how a case settles, as 
long as it settles?”  Looking at it from this point of view, one might well conclude that 
it would be preferable to make general civil mediation purely voluntary rather than 
court ordered.  
If programs of court-ordered general civil case mediation are continued, their rather 
weak showing in the evaluative research suggests that court administrators should 
evaluate them and look for possible improvements. 
Clarke & Gordon, supra note 49, at 336.  See also Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ 
Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and 
Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 559 (2008) (“In establishing 
their programs, many contemporary courts echo these two core originating values of ADR.  
The preambles of statutes and local court rules that establish some court programs suggest that 
their primary goals are to improve court efficiency or save money.”).                   
 
52
 Patricia Hughes, Mandatory Mediation: Opportunity or Subversion?, 19 WINDSOR Y.B. 
ACCESS JUST. 161, 189 n.121 (2001) (citing L. BOULLE & K.J. KELLY, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES, 
PROCESS, PRACTICE (Canadian Edition) 19-20 (1998) (“perfunctory participation by litigants 
with the result that ‘the mediation could constitute an expensive exercise in futility . . .’”)).  
See also Streeter-Schaefer, supra note 45, at 385 (“‘You can’t avoid being sued, but you 
should have the right to answer before the jury, instead of having settlement virtually extorted 
from you by piling on extraordinary costs of litigation in the form of settlement 
conferences.”’) (internal citation omitted); Tony Biller, Comment, Good Faith Mediation: 
Improving Efficiency, Cost, and Satisfaction in North Carolina’s Pre-Trial Process, 18 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 281, 288 (1996) (“Another concern is that mandatory mediation will 
decrease judicial efficiency and increase costs.  Satellite litigation may be instituted upon a 
belief that the opposing party failed to properly mediate.”).       
 
53
 Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the 
Experience of Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565, 572-73 
(1997).  See also Jeff Kichaven & Deborah Rothman, Lawyers Speak Out on Justifying Court 
Mediation to Their Clients, 21 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 149, 166 (2003) (“Eric 
Joss, a partner in the Los Angeles office of Paul Hastings Janofsky & Walker, says:  ‘The key 
element is the openness of the parties to mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism.  The 
chances of success are diminished if either side is a reluctant participant.  It’s not always an 
insurmountable hurdle, but is a hurdle.’”). 
 
54
 Wissler, supra note 53, at 565 (emphasis added). 
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as well as the timing of that participation.55  In cases involving complex emotional 
issues, such as will contests, an ill-timed mediation may be particularly traumatic for 
parties with unresolved or fresh emotions such as grief or guilt.56  
On the other hand, many parties would not find their way to a mediator absent a 
court order.  Lawyers who are “occasional players” in the court room may be 
unfamiliar with the process.57  Further, mandating mediation allows counsel to 
circumvent the stigma of being misperceived as weak at the suggestion that the 
dispute be voluntarily submitted to mediation, either by opposing counsel or his own 
client.58   
The use of mediation has flourished within certain types of litigation, but it has 
gained less momentum in other areas.  Its application to will contest cases seems to 
have gained traction as part of a larger movement in the United States to encourage 
the use of alternative dispute resolution through court-ordered mediation programs.59  
While these programs differ from state-to-state, there is also variation within each 
state when the programs are established at the county or courthouse level.60  Most 
                                                          
 
55
 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 
1545, 1581-82 (1991). 
 
56
 Id. at 1605 n.276 (“I have been struck, in the course of conversations with women who 
have undergone the mandatory mediation process, by how often these women have said, ‘I felt 
as if I were raped.’”). 
 
57
 Kichaven & Rothman, supra note 53, at 166. 
 
58
 Id. 
 
59
 Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More than Money: Mediation Clauses in 
Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 549 (2008).  See generally Gary, 
supra note 10; Brian C. Hewitt, Probate Mediation: A Means to an End, 40 AUG RES GESTAE 
41 (1996) (observing that though there has been initial success of mediation as applied to civil 
disputes, the mediation of probate disputes has lagged behind other areas of litigation); Ray D. 
Madoff, Mediating Probate Disputes: A Study of Court Sponsored Programs, 38 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 697 (2004); Mary F. Radford, An Introduction to the Uses of Mediation and 
Other Forms of Dispute Resolution in Probate, Trust, and Guardianship Matters, 34 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000).  
 
60
 For example, the Probate Court in Dallas, Texas created one of the first formal 
programs for the mediation of probate disputes.  See Madoff, supra note 59, at 702.  In 
Florida, general guidelines and rules applying to mediation are set forth in state statute, but 
each county administers its own mediation program and so the programs vary greatly from 
county-to-county.  Id. at 704-05.  Fulton County in Atlanta, Georgia has required mediation 
for all probate disputes since 1990, and parties are threatened with dismissal of their case if 
they refuse to participate in mediation.  Id. at 707-08.  The California Superior Court in Los 
Angeles established the Probate Court Supervised Mediation Program in 1997 in which 
virtually all probate cases are referred to mediation, while San Francisco has adopted an 
informal, voluntary program of mediation.  Id. at 714-15.  County mediation programs across 
California widely vary in both staffs and resources.  Some programs have “large professional 
staffs of mediators, all of whom are experienced mental health professionals; in other 
counties, there may be only one mediator with little professional training.”  Grillo, supra note 
55, at 1553.  Additionally, “some [California] counties have extensive office facilities in 
which to house their mediation program and provide the opportunity to have several meetings 
with the mediators; in others, mediation takes place in the twenty minutes before court in a 
hallway.”  Id.  In Illinois, Cook County’s Mediation Program allows parties to opt out of 
mediation and instead pursue trial.  Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ 
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court-ordered mediation programs handle a broad range of civil cases, although there 
are a small number of programs dedicated exclusively to probate disputes and will 
contest cases.61  Some courts refer probate cases to mediation on a voluntary basis 
while others route all probate disputes to mediation.62   
With the escalating number of court-ordered mediation programs comes a 
corresponding surge in criticism about the way in which such programs are being 
used by the courts,63 and it is unclear that this process is suited to resolve these 
                                                          
Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal 
Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63, 98 (2008).  At the county-funded Citizens’ Dispute 
Program in Memphis, Tennessee, parties filing a complaint are given the option of mediation 
and “[t]he party against whom the complaint would be filed can choose between a lawsuit and 
mediation, if it is a civil case, or, if it is a criminal case, an arrest warrant or mediation.”  Jill 
Richey Rayburn, Note, Neighborhood Justice Centers: Community Use of ADR—Does It 
Really Work?, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1197, 1222 (1996).  See also Cynthia A. Savage, 
Recommendations Regarding Establishment of a Mediation Clinic, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 511, 542-49 (2010) (listing the numerous and varied court-sponsored and community-
sponsored mediation options in and around New York City and Denver, Colorado).   
 
61
 An ever-evolving list of mediation programs are being designed and implemented, 
which makes it near-impossible to provide a comprehensive list of all the programs specific to 
probate litigation.  See Love & Sterk, supra note 59, at 542 n.8 (listing many probate 
mediation programs which have been implemented). 
 
62
 Madoff, supra note 59, at 699 (“[T]o overcome reluctance by the parties to use 
mediation, some judges require that all disputes go to mediation before they can proceed in 
court.”).  In Florida, probate cases are handled by the Circuit Civil Mediation Program.  
Judges regularly order probate cases to mediation, and the parties have ten days from the date 
of the order to select their mediator or one will be appointed.  Id. at 705-06.  Since 1990, the 
Fulton County Probate Court in Georgia refers mediation for all probate disputes before a case 
will be placed on the judge’s calendar.  Id. at 707-09.  Los Angeles established the Probate 
Court-Supervised Mediation Program, and once the court has assigned a case for court-
supervised mediation, the parties have thirty days to engage in mediation efforts.  Id. at 710-
12 (2004).  See also Roger Jellenik, Probate Court Mediation Pilot Program, S.C. LAW., July 
2008, at 20-22 (“On August 23, 2007, the Supreme Court of South Carolina issued an 
Administrative Order adopting a pilot program for mediation in our state’s probate courts . . . . 
[P]robate courts handle different kinds of cases, and the application of mediation may depend 
to some extent upon what kind of case is to be heard . . . . [A] probate court is required to refer 
all contested guardianship and conservatorship proceedings to mediation, but referral of all 
other cases is a matter of judicial discretion.”); Chester, supra note 34, at 199-200 (discussing 
probate mediation programs in Hawaii and Oregon.  “The courts in Hawaii are so serious 
about ADR that if the court refers a case to mediation either on its own motion or that of one 
of the parties, participation is mandatory . . . .  Although Oregon’s courts can also order 
mandatory mediation, this option is rarely exercised.”).  See generally Streeter-Schaefer, 
supra note 45 (discussing mandatory mediation programs for civil disputes in Indiana, 
Nevada, North Carolina, Delaware, Louisiana, Alabama, Montana, and Maine).  Other states 
with mandatory mediation programs include: California, Florida, and Texas.  Harold Baer, Jr., 
The Past and Future of ADR, in 4 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 44:3 (Robert L. Haig, ed., 
2d ed. 2010).  
 
63
 See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Staying in Orbit, or Breaking Free: The Relationship of 
Mediation to the Courts Over Four Decades, 84 N.D. L. REV. 705, 705 (2008) (“The 
acceptance and use of mediation by courts—at the state and federal level—has grown steadily 
over the last several decades.  Today, mediation is a central element in the overall case-
management system of many courts, and this phenomenon continues to grow unabated.  At 
 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/4
2011] THE INAPPROPRIATE IMPOSITION 525 
 
cases.64  Probate matters, and will contest cases in particular, often involve familial 
relationships, and it is not uncommon for power imbalances to arise within a family 
unit as a result of gender, age, or personality.65  There will be cases in which this 
power imbalance is not obvious to the mediator.  Assuming the mediator identifies 
any power disparities, she may adjust the mediation process accordingly—although a 
question remains as to whether shifting the process in this way compromises the 
mediator’s role as an unbiased, third-party neutral.66   
Further, the process of mediation may not be ideally suited to resolve will contest 
cases involving estate plans that may have been the product of intensive inter vivos 
tax planning.67  In such cases, mediated settlement may have a profound impact upon 
tax liability and reporting obligations for the estate, as well as beneficiaries who are 
not directly involved in the controversy.  In the hands of a mediator without 
sufficient experience in both taxation and probate law, tax consequences may arise 
as the unintended consequence of a mediation settlement.68  Although most 
jurisdictions have some minimum requirements to ensure that the mediator is trained 
in mediation, there is usually no articulated requirement that the mediator be an 
attorney or have knowledge of the law of wills.69   
Court-ordered mediation may be ill-suited to resolve will contest cases—which 
are often highly charged, emotional controversies—as a matter of poor timing.  
Courts will frequently mandate mediation at a specific phase of each case,70 and this 
                                                          
the same time, however, another quite different phenomenon has emerged—the expression of 
serious criticism from mediation scholars and experts about the way mediation is used by the 
courts.”) (footnotes omitted).                       
 
64
 Madoff, supra note 59, at 698.   
 
65
 “In some families, the presence of a bully or a wimp among the beneficiaries might 
make an adjudicative process more appealing than a consensual process where a weaker party 
might be overpowered.”  Love & Sterk, supra note 59, at 543-44.  See also Gary, supra note 
10, at 411-12. 
 
66
 Gary, supra note 10, at 403-04. 
 
67
 Hewitt, supra note 59, at 44.     
 
68
 For example,  
[In Florida, m]ost attorneys stated a preference for choosing their own mediators 
rather than using those in the court-affiliated program.  As one attorney said: There is 
a court affiliated program, but most sophisticated probate lawyers don't use it.  There 
are probably 12-14 lawyers in the South Florida area who specialize in probate 
litigation.  The litigation is usually very involved.  Most of the certified mediators are 
not probate lawyers or do not have background in probate or tax—so the lawyers find 
that it is better to choose their own mediator. 
Madoff, supra note 59, at 707.   
 
69
 A frequent attorney criticism of court-ordered mediation is that time and money were 
wasted with a mediator who was not qualified.  “Thus, for example, the mediator for all 
probate disputes in the court-sponsored program in Collier County, Florida is an experienced 
mediator but is not an attorney and has no particular training in probate law.”  Id. at 722.    
 
70
 Id. at 724. (“Programs with mandatory mediation, such as those in Georgia and Los 
Angeles, often provide standing orders for mediation before the judge hears the case.”). 
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type of standardization in timing preys upon a grief-stricken party.71  Further, 
ordering a case to mediation before discovery72 is more likely to shift settlement 
away from an end-result based upon the law to one shaped by social norms,73 which 
is particularly problematic with regard to will contest cases and explored further in 
Section IV.   
IV.  THE INAPPROPRIATE IMPOSITION OF COURT-ORDERED MEDIATION IN WILL 
CONTESTS  
 Mediation has been embraced by courts over the last few decades, owing largely 
to the desire—though arguably self-serving—to reduce the number of cases on the 
court docket.  This Article neither supports nor critiques the use of court-ordered 
mediation in litigation cases generally, but instead suggests that some types of cases 
may be inappropriate for court-ordered mediation because of the substantive law 
underlying the controversy.  This section explains why court-ordered mediation 
contravenes the substantive law applicable to will contest cases and explains why 
court-ordered mediation is inappropriate in these cases.    
The law of succession and inheritance in every jurisdiction in the United States is 
steeped in centuries old legal tradition and slow to embrace change.74  Our concept 
of inheritance is built upon freedom of testation, namely, the right to control the 
disposition of one’s life possessions and wealth at death.75  Facilitating the 
testamentary intent of the decedent is therefore pivotal to respecting foundational 
property rights at death.76  Subject to limited exceptions and statutory formalities, 
every decedent has the right to designate her heirs and distribute her property in any 
manner that she so chooses,77 provided that she takes the affirmative step of 
                                                          
 
71
 Although early mediation can allow resolution of a dispute before positions have 
hardened, it may also be unproductive if emotions (such as grief) are fresh.  Id.  
 
72
 Scott R. Belhorn, Settling Beyond the Shadow of the Law: How Mediation Can Make 
the Most of Social Norms, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 981, 988 (2005) (“Mediating 
early—that is, before formal discovery—not only saves transaction costs, but it also increases 
the likelihood that the parties will honor efficient extra-legal social norms.”).  
 
73
 Id. at 990. (“Empirical evidence and theoretical support from this field over the last 
decade suggests that informal, decentralized methods of social control (i.e., social norms) 
create incentives that are as powerful determinants of rational choice as are legal rules.”). 
 
74
 “The law of every United States jurisdiction was derived from the English model set 
forth in either the Statute of Frauds of 1677 or the 1837 Wills Act.”  Haneman, supra note 4 
(citing Charles I. Nelson & Jeanne M. Starck, Formalities and Formalism: A Critical Look at 
the Execution of Wills, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 331, 345 (1979)).   
 
75
 Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule 
Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 280 n.21 (2010).       
 
76
 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.   
 
77
 See Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and 
Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 552 (1999) (“In the ideology of American wills 
law, the testator is a rugged individualist.  He owes no duties to family or friends.  He 
generally is free to distribute his estate to whomever he pleases, subject only to a limited duty 
to his spouse.  His motives, whether benevolent or spiteful, are of no concern.  His estate is 
responsible for his torts and bound by his express contracts, but any other expectations he may 
have fostered during his life are irrelevant.  If his will devastates family members, that is 
entirely beside the point.  Who deserves to share in his estate is his decision alone to make.”).   
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executing a will.78  A will is a direct expression of the decedent’s intent, and it is an 
instrument that does far more than merely dictate a distribution.79  In drafting a will, 
the decedent goes through a reflective process of inventorying her assets, measuring 
interpersonal relationships, and weighing the wants or needs of important people in 
her life.  When the decedent connects a beneficiary to an asset, this choice is 
worthwhile—and respecting this choice is essential in an inheritance system built 
upon freedom of testation.  
The emphasis upon the dead hand of the testator is a common-law thread that is 
woven throughout the fabric of judicial decisions in will contest cases.80  Ordinarily, 
the only relief available in these cases is a court order to deny or allow probate of 
some or all of the will in question.81  The inheritance scheme created by the testator 
changes only to the extent that the court rules on the merits and strikes all or part of 
the contested will, or probates an entirely different instrument.  Although the rare 
judicial decision evidences a vacillation from the bench between effectuating the 
intent of the testator and facilitating a fair result, the scale remains tilted in favor of 
the former.82   
Conversely, the fairness of the result plays a central role in the process of 
mediation, therefore implicitly shifting focus to the needs and rights of the living.83  
Advocates of mediation contend that it is ideal for the emotionally-charged family 
disputes that drive will contest cases specifically for this reason—the win-win 
approach of this dispute resolution process appeals to a family’s sense of fairness.84  
The rhetoric of mediation is one of reasonableness and compromise, and not one of 
                                                          
 
78
 If the decedent chooses to take no action, every state has a statute of intestate succession 
that directs the distribution of property in a way that is meant to approximate the intent of the 
average testator.  R. Brent Drake, Note, Status or Contract?: A Comparative Analysis of 
Inheritance Rights Under Equitable Adoption and Domestic Partnership Doctrines, 39 GA. L. 
REV. 675, 676 (2005); Adam J. Hirsh, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search 
of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2004).    
 
79
 Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, The Mandatory Nature of Inheritance, 53 AM. J. JURIS. 105, 111 
(2008).   
 
80
 Chester, supra note 34, at 204.  Some probate courts have eliminated jury trials.  
California and Massachusetts, uneasy with the fact that juries are more likely than judges to 
decide will contests in favor of the contestants, have barred juries from hearing will contests.  
Ronald Chester, Mediation and Jury Trials as Means of Resolving Will Contests, 1 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L.J. 267, 269 (2001).  Additional states that do not permit jury decisions of will 
contests include: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oregon, South Dakota, Maine, and Kansas.  Id. at 269 
n.13 (citing Josef Athanas, Comment, The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials in Will Contests, 1990 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 529, 532 (1990)).  See generally Josef Athanas, Comment, The Pros and 
Cons of Jury Trials in Will Contests, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 529 (1990).   
 
81
 ROSS & REED, supra note 11, § 1:2. 
 
82
 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 3, at 2. 
 
83
 Chester, supra note 34, at 176-77, 204-05. 
 
84
 Id. at 204-05.  Professor Chester, an advocate of the use of mediation to resolve will 
contests, believes that the common law focus on testator’s wishes is “fraught with 
uncertainty” and “gives the dead hand of the testator control over the needs and rights of the 
living.”  Id. at 177.   
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right and wrong.85  The process deemphasizes legal principles, as well as related 
principles of fault and blame, and the parties are discouraged from shaping the 
contours of settlement based upon that which they perceive to be their legal rights 
and entitlements.86  It is understood that a compromised settlement is not always the 
legally-correct result. 87 
Unfortunately, mediation rejects the primacy of testamentary intent in resolving 
the will contest.  The intent of the testator may be nothing more than an obstacle to 
mediation, in that the main actor is deceased and his views are therefore not 
represented at the negotiating table.88  Testamentary intent may be wielded as both a 
shield and a sword by grieving participants who can easily become entrenched in the 
belief that the testator “would have wanted this” and “I am going to carry out what I 
know his [sic] wishes are.”89   
At the Roscoe Pound Conference of 1976, Harvard Professor Frank E.A. Sander 
was invited by Chief Justice Warren Burger to present a paper in which he imparted 
several groundbreaking notions that have earned him regard as a pioneer in the field 
of alternative dispute resolution.90  Professor Sander envisioned a multi-door 
courthouse offering a “rich variety of different processes, which . . . may provide far 
more ‘effective’ conflict resolution” and suggested that rational criteria be developed 
“‘for allocating various types of disputes to different dispute resolution 
processes.’”91  No longer novel or revolutionary, many federal and state courts have 
incorporated mediation as a stage in the civil litigation process through their court-
ordered mediation programs.  And though many programs vest the presiding judge 
with the power to exclude a case from court-ordered mediation as a matter of 
subjective determination, these programs generally have not developed and do not 
apply rational criteria whereby certain types of cases are wholly exempt from court-
ordered mediation.92   
                                                          
 
85
 Grillo, supra note 55, at 1559-60. 
 
86
 Id.   
 
87
 “Rather . . . [settlements occur] because our trial system has become unworkable.  The 
American trial has been bludgeoned by lengthy delays, high attorneys’ fees, discovery wars . . 
. and the world’s most extensive collection of cumbersome procedures.”  Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Vanishing Civil Jury, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 5–6 (1990). 
 
88
 Madoff, supra note 16, at 177-78.  “‘There is a shadow at the table who can’t speak and 
can’t inform the discussion.’”  Id. at 178.   
 
89
 Id. 
 
90
 Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, The Lawyers’ Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy: 
A Commentary by and Responses to Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow: Look Before You 
Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons From the Institutionalization of Court-Connected 
Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 401-03 & n.10 (2004). 
 
91
 Id. at 402. 
 
92
 For example, “Indiana’s court-annexed mediation rule also allows the judge to terminate 
the mediation process for good cause at any time and return the case to the court’s docket.”  
Streeter-Schaefer, supra note 45, at 374.  Similarly, North Carolina’s mandatory mediation 
program “allows the parties to file a motion to stop mediation before the mediation occurs.  
The court may grant the motion if good cause is shown.”  Id. at 375.  Louisiana’s court-
mandated mediation program “provides that all parties with authority to negotiate and enter 
binding agreements must attend the court-annexed mediation.”  Id. at 376 (emphasis added).  
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Court-ordered mediation is problematic as applied to will contest cases as a 
whole.  Mediation’s forward-looking view runs contrary to the backward-focused 
view that is central to the law of wills.93  Although the legal process is replete with 
gaps, contradictions, and ambiguities,94 the incorporation of mediation as a 
mandatory stage in the lifecycle of a will contest case is a contradiction that has been 
blessed by the court system.95  This Article contends that unintended consequences 
may arise from this contradiction.  Although mediation can and should exist outside 
of the judicial system, it is problematic for it to be incorporated into the system 
through court-ordered mediation programs when the process perverts underlying 
rules of law that the court is expected to enforce should the mediation fail.96   
In assessing the value and efficiency of court-ordered mediation, empirical data 
has been gathered regarding the perceptions of judges, attorneys, and parties.97  One 
                                                          
In California, even domestic violence cases are referred to mediation under the state’s 
mandatory mediation program—it “is the only state that does not provide a complete 
exemption from mediation in cases where domestic violence has occurred.”  Kerry Loomis, 
Comment, Domestic Violence and Mediation: A Tragic Combination for Victims in California 
Family Court, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 355, 355-56 (1999).   
 
93
 In a similar vein, it has been suggested that will contest cases may not be appropriate 
cases for jury verdict, because juries seem to be focused upon the fairness of the disposition of 
property to the living—an approach that is wholly incompatible with the law.  See Athanas, 
supra note 80, at 545-47.  See also Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance 
Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 237 (2001) (providing that “[r]eformers have emphasized the 
particular threat that juries pose to nonconforming wills.  They argue that in mental capacity 
cases, juries ‘are more disposed to work equity for the disinherited than to follow the law’ or 
the testator's wishes.”). 
 
94
 Judge Cardozo observed that “[d]eep beneath the surface of the legal system, hidden in 
the structure of the constituent atoms, are these attractions and repulsions, uniting and 
dissevering as in one unending paradox.”  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL 
SCIENCE (1928), reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 251, 255 
(Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).       
 
95
 Minnesota has a well-established program of court-ordered mediation, in which judges 
routinely order parties to participate in mediation, even when the parties and counsel advise 
that mediation is not appropriate.  A January 2003 survey of trial judges resulted in some 
judicial responses to one question in the survey that bear careful examination and underscore 
the possibility that justice is not done through mandatory mediation.  For example:  
“‘Mediated settlement should be based on application of law to facts, not on fear of the 
unknown.’ (Judge # 129)”; “‘If party is entitled to dismissal then they shouldn’t be coerced to 
settle.’ (Judge # 143)”; “‘If there is an unanswered question of law, the parties cannot 
effectively mediate.’ (Judge # 20).”  McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 90, at 413.  
 
96
 The contention of this Article is not that all settlement is inappropriate, but that 
settlement of will contest cases through court-ordered mediation is inappropriate.   
 
97
 See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a 
Better Way?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 93 (2002); Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, the Court Is 
in Session: What Judges Say About Court-Connected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 377 (2007); McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 90; Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L. 
Wissler, Finding Out If It Is True: Comparing Mediation and Negotiation Through Research, 
2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 131 (2002); Thomas B. Metzloff et al., Empirical Perspectives on 
Mediation and Malpractice, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (1997); Roselle L. Wissler, 
Representation in Mediation: What We Know From Empirical Research, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 419 (2010).   
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commentator observed that all of the data, considered cumulatively, suggests that “to 
achieve the goals of substantive justice, procedural justice, and efficient justice . . . 
[in part,] Courts should clarify that their primary objectives are to provide outcomes 
that are: perceived as fair; consistent with the rule of law; and likely to be durable.”98  
When a court endorses and mandates a process that is inconsistent with the rule of 
law, the court is making it possible for the parties to avoid the rule of law and is 
therefore undermining the ability of lawmakers to establish a rule of law.  
Consequently, a court must exclude those cases from mandatory mediation that are 
determined to be inconsistent with the rule of law, and this determination should be 
made by filtering cases at two levels:  on a categorical basis after an analysis of 
foundational rules, and also a case-by-case basis after an application of law to 
facts.99    
On a categorical basis, will contest cases should be excluded from the court-
ordered mediation process.  Because mediation is inconsistent with the idea of 
testamentary intent, a mediator cannot be expected to respect the intent of the 
testator in structuring a settlement.  Court-ordered mediation forces a will contest 
into a dispute resolution process beyond the reach of legislators.  Although the right 
to accept or reject settlement is vested with the parties, this degree of voluntariness 
does not mitigate the threshold coercion of the parties into the process.100  
Mandatory mediation inappropriately imposes an obstruction on the right of access 
to the courts when the mediation process itself contravenes the substantive law of the 
case.101  Any other approach erodes the rule of law the courts are meant to apply—
namely, effectuating the intent of the testator.  Undoubtedly, less judicial emphasis 
upon effectuating the intent of the testator would be lauded by many as a positive, 
modern change.102  It is problematic, however, for this type of change to result 
unintentionally—as unintentional change is often accompanied by unintended 
consequences.103     
                                                          
 
98
 McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 90, at 425. 
 
99
 This Article explores only the former and not the latter, because most court-ordered 
mediation programs vest the court with the authority to exclude disputes from the process on a 
case-by-case basis.  See supra note 62. 
 
100
 David S. Winston, Note & Comment, Participation Standards in Mandatory Mediation 
Statutes: “You Can Lead a Horse to Water . . . .”, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 187, 188-89 
(1996).    
 
101
 In a seminal case, a British Court held that “to oblige truly unwilling parties to refer 
their disputes to mediation would be to impose an unacceptable obstruction on their right of 
access to the court[s].”  Halsey v. Milton Keynes Gen. NHS Trust, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576, 
[9] (appeal taken from Eng.).   
 
102
 This Article does not contend that such change would necessarily be bad, but only that 
such change should not occur unintentionally through court-ordered mediation. 
 
103
 For example, the settlement of will contest cases that is shaped by notions of fairness, 
lay emotion and non-legal considerations may bring us closer to system in which inheritance 
rights are determined in accordance with an heir’s conduct towards the decedent—both 
rewarding positive behavior and penalizing negative acts.  China has implemented a scheme 
of inheritance that is a similar behavior-based model.  Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-
Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77, 81 (1998). 
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V.  TOWARDS SOLUTIONS:  THE APPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF MEDIATION TO WILL 
CONTESTS  
Mediation has grown in popularity over the past two decades, and it is impossible 
to ignore the practical benefits of the process.104  The inappropriate application of 
court-ordered mediation to will contest cases is not cause for wholesale 
deconstruction, but it is cause for rethinking the possibility of a style of carve-out 
that responds to the identifiable flaws. 105  The flaw in referring will contest cases to 
court-ordered mediation is rooted in inconsistency:  the court is mandating a dispute 
resolution process that disregards the intention of the testator in shaping a resolution.  
This section explores easily implemented solutions that will resolve the conflict 
between law and process.  
A probate court considers a broad range of contested matters in addition to will 
contest cases, such as objections to a financial accounting, petitions for the removal 
and surcharge of fiduciaries, and charges of breach of fiduciary duty.106  Although 
court-ordered mediation is not appropriate in will contest cases, as explained in this 
section of this Article, these cases are easily carved-out and categorically excluded 
from the process. 107  Further, it may be appropriate to use court-ordered mediation in 
the many other types of probate disputes.108   
                                                          
 
104
 For example, 
In the early 1980s, many in the negotiation field were strongly attracted by a new 
“theory” that appeared, arguing that negotiation did not have to be a zero-sum game 
with winners and losers . . . . Some of the central notions of the theory soon impacted 
the mediation field as well.  Most important among these notions was the concept that 
conflicts could and should be seen not as struggles for position, but as problems in 
how to meet seemingly (but not necessarily) incompatible needs and interests.  The 
“problem-solving” or “integrative” view of conflict and negotiation . . . became the 
basis for the view that mediation should also be seen as a process for addressing 
conflicts through creative, mutual problem-solving, not just a process of settling cases 
in the shadow of expected court outcomes . . . .  
 
The needs-and-interests language was the core of the new negotiation theory, 
reflecting the changed view that negotiation was not an adversarial battle for positions 
but rather a mutual problem-solving process aimed at uncovering and integrating 
needs and interests.  The needs-and-interests language, essentially absent from early 
mediation literature, appeared in texts on mediation soon after 1980 and gradually 
became central to an understanding of what mediation does.    
Bush, supra note 63, at 720-22.   
 
105
 Judge Cardozo observed that “there are more methods to be applied than one, that there 
is more than one string to harp upon, is in itself a forward step and a long one upon the 
highway to salvation.”  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, The Growth of Law, and the Method of 
Judging, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 211, 214 (Margaret E. Hall 
ed., 1947). 
 
106
 Cumming, supra note 8, at 1300. 
 
107
 “When litigation arises from disputes over an estate plan, it is typically in the form of a 
will contest.”  Street, supra note 15, at 142.  However, will construction disputes also arise, in 
which all parties concede to the will’s validity but disagree as to the meaning of words or 
provisions in the will.  The interpretation of the words may affect the identity of beneficiaries 
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The inappropriate application of court-ordered mediation to will contest cases is 
a problem that may also be solved through a simple change in programmatic design: 
mediation that is court-ordered because it is the intent of the testator.  This intent 
may be inferred from the testamentary instrument itself, or alternatively, from a 
statutory form that is executed by the testator and submitted to probate with the 
testamentary instrument.   
This proposition requires that the testator make some form of lifetime election in 
favor of mediation.  Until such a time that mediation is as widely known and 
understood by the average layperson as litigation, the process of mediation must be 
explained to the testator.109  There is no question that mediation has numerous 
features that may make it more desirable than litigation, however the competent 
estate planner may not assume that mediation is desirable to each of his clients.110  
An election in favor of mediation introduces a degree of uncertainty into the estate 
plan of the testator, as he cannot be certain as to how assets will be distributed after 
his death.   
This may be a particularly relevant consideration for the testator who is aware of 
power imbalances among his beneficiaries.111  If it is known to the testator that the 
                                                          
or property.  Love & Sterk, supra note 59, at 555-56.  For purposes of this Article, will 
construction disputes are encompassed under will contests.   
 
108
 Additional probate disputes include: tortious interference with the expectancy under a 
will, petitions for removal of estate administrators, guardianship contests, modification and 
trust reformation suits, trust termination suits, and breach of fiduciary duty actions.  See 1 
MICHAEL P. MCELROY, HORNER PROBATE PRACTICE AND ESTATES §§ 16A:1, 17:10 (2011); 
Karen S. Gerstner, A Message to Clients . . . Avoiding Probate Court Litigation, 22 PROB. & 
PROP. 56, 57 (2008). 
 
109
 Abraham Lincoln once wrote, “‘Discourage litigation’ . . . . ‘Persuade your neighbors to 
compromise whenever you can.  Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real 
loser—in fees, expenses, and waste of time.’”  BRIAN DIRCK, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 67 (2007).   
 
110
 Mediation is a discrete process that avoids the public airing of private family disputes, a 
flexible process that allows for creative problem solving, a less destructive process that may 
preserve long-term relationships among disputants, and an efficient process that is often more 
expedient and less costly than the alternatives.  See generally Robert D. Benjamin, A Critique 
of Mediation—Challenging Misconceptions, Assessing Risks and Weighing the Advantages, 
146 PITTSBURG LEGAL J. 37 (1998); Michael Goldsmith, Confessions of a Litigator: The 
Surprising Benefits of Mediation, 22 UTAH B.J. 11 (2009); Lela Porter Love, Mediation of 
Probate Matters: Leaving a Valuable Legacy, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 255 (2001); Judith P. 
Meyer, The Pros and Cons of Mediation, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 8 (1997); Mary F. Radford, 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Mediation in Probate, Trust, and Guardianship Matters, 1 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 241 (2001); Gary D. Williams, Weighing the Costs and Benefits of 
Mediating Estate Planning Issues Before Disputes Between Family Members Arise: The Scale 
Tips in Favor of Mediation, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 819 (2001).   
 
111
 See Chester, supra note 34, at 202 (stating that “[e]ven the most capable mediator may 
not be able to defeat years of domination by one individual over another”); Susan N. Gary, 
Mediating Probate Disputes, 13 PROB. & PROP. 10, 13 (1999) (stating that power imbalances 
are always a concern in mediating probate disputes, as power imbalances may be implicit 
among siblings or family members from different generations); Madoff, supra note 59, at 700 
(stating that power imbalances “may cause people to agree to settle in ways that do not truly 
reflect their best interests”); Williams, supra note 110, at 844 (stating that “in cases where one 
party has significantly less bargaining power than the other,” a mediator may simply facilitate 
the wishes of the stronger party).   
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strength of one of his beneficiaries overshadows a weaker beneficiary, he may be 
strongly opposed to mediation for fear that the outcome will be capitulation instead 
of equitable settlement.112   
The fully-informed testator wishing to make an election in favor of mediation 
would ideally execute a standardized form to do so.  A standardized form may be 
adopted on a statewide basis and made widely available through the Internet.113  This 
form would allow the testator to express his intent that post-mortem conflicts be 
submitted to mediation.  The form may also include clauses that may be selected by 
the testator to incentivize the beneficiaries and contestants to submit in good faith—
for example, a clause providing that all or part of the attorneys’ fees for both parties 
will be paid from the estate assets if settlement occurs not more than two hundred 
days from date of death.  
If the testator fails to execute the statutory form, intent may nonetheless be 
inferred from the language of the testamentary instrument itself. 114  Some estate 
planners may build mediation clauses into the estate plan, seeking to reduce the 
likelihood of costly (both emotionally and financially) and time-consuming litigation 
after his death.115  Although it is uncertain whether or not such clauses will be 
enforced, they nonetheless evidence the testator’s intent to resolve a post-mortem 
dispute through mediation versus litigation.116  Conversely, a no-contest clause may 
                                                          
 
112
 “In some families, the presence of a bully or a wimp among the beneficiaries might 
make an adjudicative process more appealing than a consensual process where a weaker party 
might be overpowered.”  Love &. Sterk, supra note 59, at 543-44.  See also Gary, supra note 
10, at 411-12.   
 
113
 Many states have standardized probate forms and make them available online at no 
charge—some examples include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, 
Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin.  See 
Technology—Probate, 21 PROB. & PROP. 50, 50-51 (2007).  See also 15 KATHERINE W. 
LAMBERT, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES § 5:36 (9th ed. 2010). 
 
114
 The notion of using ADR vehicles in the probate context is certainly not new.  George 
Washington’s will included the following item, which, in essence, mandated binding 
arbitration of any disputes arising from the administration of his estate: 
“[T]hat all disputes (if unhappily they should arise) shall be decided by three impartial 
and intelligent men, known for their probity and good understanding; two to be chose 
by the disputants each having the choice of one, and the third by those two—which 
three men thus chose shall, unfettered by law or legal constructions, declare their 
sense of the Testator’s intention, and such decision is, to all intents and purposes, to be 
as binding on the parties as if it had been given in the Supreme Court of the United 
States.” 
Hewitt, supra note 59, at 41 (quoting Will of George Washington (July 9, 1799)).    
 
115
 For purposes of this Article, an estate planner is an attorney who has done or is doing 
estate planning on behalf of a client.  Estate planning is the method by which a client passes 
his wealth to his beneficiaries and involves more than simply drafting a will.   
 
116
 A mediation clause may not be enforced either because it is not contractually agreed to 
by the beneficiaries, or in the case of the will contest, the validity of the underlying instrument 
containing the clause is disputed.  See Love & Sterk, supra note 59, at 561 (“[T]he contestants 
are challenging the validity of the will itself—the very document that includes the mediation 
clause.  If the will falls, the mediation clause falls with it . . . . [U]nlike the situation of an 
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evidence that the testator does not intend a dispute to be referred to mediation.  The 
testator may have included a no-contest clause to prevent the public airing of family 
disputes, preserve his preferred distributional scheme, or to deter expensive 
litigation.117  Arguably, none of these objectives are served by court-ordered 
mediation: The family dispute is placed on the public record when the contestant 
files the will contest case; a mediated settlement will undoubtedly alter the intended 
distributional scheme; and a contestant otherwise deterred from litigation may file a 
claim with the knowledge that it will be ordered into mediation.   
Relying upon the language of the instrument itself is the less desirable approach 
only because it introduces uncertainty.  If the will contest is filed to dispute the 
validity of the underlying will, it may be problematic to look at that same instrument 
to determine testamentary intent.118  A standardized form, implemented on a 
statewide basis, provides a safe harbor for the testator by allowing mediation to be 
applied to any probate dispute arising from his estate.   
A state that endorses mediation as a dispute resolution process may be inclined to 
substitute an opt-out approach over the opt-in approach suggested above.  Under 
both systems, the testator has input on whether or not probate disputes may be 
ordered to mediation.  Superficially, neither system gives greater or lesser rights than 
the other.  However, the opt-out system infers permission for mediation unless a 
testator objects, whereas the primary objective of the programmatic change 
suggested in this Article is to clearly evidence the intent of the testator.   An opt-out 
approach does not accomplish that goal, as any number of testators may fail to opt-
out due to estate plan obsolescence, procrastination, or ignorance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
An irony inheres where the legal system mandates a dispute resolution process 
that perverts the underlying rule of law that courts have purported to embrace for 
centuries—effectuating testator intent in will contest cases.119  Will contest cases are 
                                                          
arbitration clause embedded in an otherwise unenforceable contract, the disputing parties 
themselves never agreed to the use of the process.”).   
 
117
 Id. at 567-68.   
 
118
 In Hawaii, legislation was introduced in 2004, and again in 2005, to provide that a 
probate court must order mediation where a testator has included a mediation clause in his 
will.  Daniel Bent, “My Bequest to My Heirs: Years of Contentious, Family Splitting 
Litigation . . .”, HAW. B.J., Feb. 2004, at 28; Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, 
Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust 
Litigation, But Are They Enforceable?, 42 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 351, 364-65 (2007). 
 
119
 See Fischer v. Heckerman, 772 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (“The right of a 
testator to make a will according to his own wishes is jealously guarded by the courts, 
regardless of a court’s view of the justice of the chosen disposition.”); In re Estate of Janney, 
446 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Pa. 1982) (“It is settled in this Commonwealth, as in New Jersey, that 
the intention of the testator is of primary importance, the lodestar, cornerstone, cardinal 
rule.”); Clark v. Connor, 117 S.E.2d 465, 468 (N.C. 1960) (“The rule is elementary that the 
intention of the testator is the polar star which is to guide in the interpretation of all wills, and, 
when ascertained, effect will be given to it unless it violates some rule of law, or is contrary to 
public policy.”); MacDonald v. Manning, 239 A.2d 640, 644 (R.I. 1968) (“Our primary 
obligation is to ascertain, if possible, the testator’s dispositive intent.”); Farmers & Merchs. 
Bank of Keyser v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank of Keyser, 216 S.E.2d 769, 772 (W. Va. 1975) 
(“The paramount principle in construing or giving effect to a will is that the intention of the 
 
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/4
2011] THE INAPPROPRIATE IMPOSITION 535 
 
not suited for court-ordered mediation without the consent of the testator,120 because 
testamentary intent is laid to waste by a mediated settlement that alters the 
dispositive plan set forth in the will.  When the judicial system incorporates a 
process that weighs the needs and wants of the living, thereby unintentionally 
turning focus away from the intent of the testator, it undermines the property rights 
of the decedent.  A larger question emerges: Are the foundational rules in the law of 
wills suited to the evolving needs of modern society, or are they merely a relic of the 
common law?121  Until this question is answered, a shifting of these rules should not 
arise as an unintended consequence of court-ordered mediation.  The inappropriate 
imposition of court-ordered mediation to will contest cases may be remedied through 
an easily implemented legislative solution that resolves the conflict between law and 
process.   
To a great extent, this discussion is really an indictment against those courts that 
indiscriminately order most or all of the cases on their dockets to mediation without 
regard to the nature of the underlying claim.  Perhaps our court system is no longer 
equipped to deal with the number and complexity of cases flooding the dockets, but 
judicial economy is not a sufficient justification for the courts to indiscriminately 
mainstream mediation.  It is problematic for civil courts to mandate a dispute 
resolution process that may by its very nature contravene important policy 
considerations at the core of the substantive law applicable to a given case.  This is a 
call for careful examination of court-ordered mediation programs to determine which 
types of cases should be categorically excluded from the process, or what simple 
adjustments need to be made to include these cases.   
 
                                                          
testator prevails, unless it is contrary to some positive rule of law or principle of public 
policy.”).   
 
120
 The American system of inheritance is built upon the foundation of donative freedom.  
Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 84, 133 
(1994).   
 
121
 See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 2180, 2251 (2011) (“The weight of scholarly opinion nowadays favors whittling down 
freedom of testation.”).   
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